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O NE OF the hardy perennials in labor literature is flower-
ing again-the contention that employers should be permitted
to use the lockout to enhance their position in collective bargaining.
Recently it was pointed out that there is "no identifiable principle
of federal labor policy that justifies holding that [t]his conduct is
unlawful."1  Just as the union is free to strike, so the employer
should be free to lock out. According to this argument, the em-
ployees have a right to have the employer bargain with their union
representative in good faith, but they do not have the right to have
him eschew the use of the economic weapons at his command so that
they can make a better bargain.2
In a similar vein, it is contended that since union members
are free to work without a contract until the time when a strike
will work the greatest hardship on their employer, the prohibition
of the bargaining lockout leaves the union with exclusive control
of any plant shutdown, a factor which may prove decisive in the
bargaining process. Therefore, so the argument goes, in the absence
of a clear statutory mandate, it does not seem consistent with the
policy of our present labor legislation to give one of the parties such
a significant bargaining advantage. 3
In addition, where an impasse in collective bargaining (when
the parties realize that neither would surrender or persuade the
other to abandon its position) is reached through inability to agree
on terms, the employer is relieved of his duty to bargain further.
However, since the NLRB has held that a strike subsequent to such
a breakdown in negotiations breaks an impasse because it effects a
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sufficient change in circumstances surrounding the bargaining,
why should not a lockout be viewed in the same light?4
Actually, there is nothing in the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, which either forbids or protects the right to lock out, as
there is the right to strike.5 In fact, prior to statutory labor law, the
common law right to lock out was never questioned by the courts,
for it was considered to be a property right; and an employer might
therefore keep out of his business or property any employee or
group of employees for any or no reason.0
Under the present labor law, however, there are protected em-
ployee rights to organize and bargain collectively, to be free of
discrimination for doing so, and to strike.7 The employer is told
to bargain in good faith and not to infringe these rights. Both the
courts and the NLRB have applied a test which attempts to balance
the right of employees to engage in concerted activities against the
the right of employers to protect their businesses. Therefore, the
legality of a particular lockout depends upon each case and is de-
termined by the application of considerations articulated in Betts
Cadillac Olds, Inc.:8 (1) the objective of the lockout, (2) the timing,
(3) the reality of the strike threat, (4) the nature and extent of the
anticipated disruption, and (5) the degree of the resultant restriction
upon the effectiveness of the concerted activity. Therefore, a lock-
out initiated to undermine or negate employee rights constitutes an
unfair labor practice, but a lockout is not considered unlawful
when a plant is closed purely as a defensive action against a strike
or threatened strike,9 to avoid serious economic loss,10 or to counter-
Comment, 15 ARK. L. Rv. 176 (1961).
5 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 13, 49 Stat. 457 (1935), as amendcd,
29 U.S.C. § 163 (1958).
0 See City Trust, Safe Deposit & Sur. Co. v. Waldhauer, 47 Misc. 7, 95 N.Y. Supp.
222 (1905); Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. 420, 28 AtI. 190 (1894); DAUGHERTY, LABOR Paon-
LEMs IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 920 (5th ed. 1941).
7 Some of these protected rights are spelled out in § 8 of the Wagner Act as
amended, which provides in pertinent part:
"(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
"(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7;
"(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization...." 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (1958).
See also the statutory provision cited in note 5 supra.
8 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951).
9 Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943).
10 Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951).
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act whipsaw tactics by a union against nonstruck members of a multi-
employer association.'1 When, however, an employer closes his
plant to force a concession from the representatives of his employees
during collective bargaining negotiations, this is considered an un-
fair labor practice, a lockout in violation of protected rights. 12 The
lockout in such cases is deemed to have lessened or possibly to have
destroyed the effectiveness of a future strike, and section 13 of the
Wagner Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, specifically forbids
interfering with, impeding, or diminishing in any way the right to
strike. In each case the NLRB determines whether the lockout is
permissible.
The Supreme Court has pointed out, however, that the NLRB
should not be the arbiter of the economic weapons which the parties
can use in seeking to gain acceptance of their bargaining demands.
In the Insurance Agents' case, 13 the Court declared that the national
labor policy consists of two factors which are of equal importance:
(1) the necessity for good faith bargaining between the parties, and
(2) the availability of economic pressure devices to each to try to
force concessions from the other. The Court further declared that
it was not the duty of the NLRB to act at large in equalizing dis-
parities of bargaining power between employer and union or to
determine their economic weapons. Such an assertion of power by
the Board would permit it to sit in judgment upon every economic
weapon the parties to a labor contract negotiation might employ.' 4
In a very strong dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said that the
majority opinion of the Court had not taken into account the
Board's right to examine the whole record of conduct of a party
charged with a refusal to bargain. He also chided the Court for
its "inexorable" premise that collective bargaining is by its nature a
bellicose process:
The broadly phrased terms of the Taft-Hartley Act should be applied
to carry out the broadly conceived policies of the Act. At the core of
promotion of collective bargaining, ... is a purpose to discourage, more
and more, industrial combatants from pressing their demands by all
available means to the limits of the justification of self-interest. This
"'Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954), set aside sub nom. Truck
Drivers Union v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
12-Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 334 (1958), enforced, 270 F.2d 40
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 917 (1959).
"I NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
14 Ibid.
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calls for appropriate judicial construction of existing legislation. The
statute lays its emphasis upon reason and a willingness to employ it as
the dominant force in bargaining.15
The decision seemed to indicate that the disputing parties were
free to press for economic advantage by whatever means not clearly
forbidden and that the Board should adopt a hands-off attitude, ab-
sent additional supporting evidence that an unfair labor practice
had been committed.
Is THE LOCKOUT THE COROLLARY OF THE STRIKE?
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent accords closely with established
NLRB policy concerning the use of permissible weapons in collec-
tive bargaining. Regarding the lockout, the Board's reasoning con-
cerns this vital question: is the lockout the corollary of the strike?
Those who propose the use of the lockout as a bargaining tactic
contend that it is such a corollary, and they find support in the fact
that the Taft-Hartley Act couples "strikes and lockouts" in sections
8 (d) (4), 203 (c), and 208 (a), thereby giving them an equality. It is
also contended that since the Supreme Court has never said whether
the lockout is the correlative of the strike but has held that the lock-
out was not forbidden by federal labor statutes, 10 this implies that a
lockout is lawful unless there is some interference with employee
rights other than an interference with the right to strike incident to
every shutdown.' 7
Legislative history of the Wagner Act indicates that there was no
intent to prohibit strikes or lockouts as such. In a speech before
the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Senator Walsh said:
[T]here are some fundamental rights an employer has, just as there are
rights an employee has. No one can compel an employer to keep his
factory open. No one can compel an employer to pay any particular
wages. No one can compel an employer to hire others in addition to
those he sees fit to hire. So with an employee; no one can compel him
to work, no one can compel him to go on strike, no one can compel him
to leave his work. No one can keep an employer from closing down his
factory and putting thousands of men and women on the street.' 8
Is Id. at 507-08.
z NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1957).
73 HARV. L. Rlv. 787 (1960).
'- 79 CONG. RFc. 7673 (1935). For a case in which the NLRB found a statutory
limitation on the employer's right to close his plant, see Darlington Mfg. Co., 139
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In reviewing the Morand Bros. Beverage Co. case,19 the Second
Circuit said that the lockout should be recognized for what it actually
is, i.e., the employer's means of exerting economic pressure on the
union, a corollary of the union's right to strike. Consequently,
once the employers had exhausted the possibilities of good faith
bargaining with the union through their association, any or all of
them were free to exercise their rights to lock out their salesmen
without waiting for a strike, just as the union was free to call a
strike against any or all of them. In the Davis Furniture Co. case,20
the Ninth Circuit said that the right of employers temporarily to
lock out all their employees is no more than equal to the right of
the union of all the employees to call out the employees of one after
another of the employers in a whipsawing manner.
The author of a recent article21 states that the lockout must be
the corollary of the strike since it is not illegal per se, it has a long
history of lawful use, and its legality is not impeached because of its
interference with strikes or other concerted activities. However, if
the employer does more than simply locking out, i.e., replaces locked
out employees, he discriminates against them. The lockout is then
unlawful, and it is no longer the corollary of the strike because the
employer's action has gone beyond that. "The employers may
exercise less than their full right to lock out, as they do when they
only partially lock out, but they may not do more than lock out, as
they do when they hire replacements for the locked out employees. 22
While the NLRB does not agree that the lockout is the corollary of
the strike,23 in a recent case, Brown Food Store,2 4 the Board found a
multi-employer lockout unlawful on this very basis. The struck
employer hired permanent replacements; then the nonstruck em-
ployers hired temporary replacements so that they could continue
N.L.R.B. 241 (1962), 1963 DuoK. L.J. 786, enforcement denied, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir.
1963), cert. granted, 32 U.S.L. W=.t 3365 (U.S. April 21, 1964).
10 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), enforced in part, remanded in part, 190 F.2d 576 (7th
Cir. 1951), supplemented and reaffirmed, 99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952), enforced, 204 F.2d
529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
.0 Davis Furniture Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1952), set aside sub nom. Leonard v.
NLRB, 205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1953).
21 Denbo, Is the Lockout the Corollary of the Strike?, 14 LAB. LJ. 400 (1963).
22-Id. at 408.
.3 Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), enforced in part, remanded
in part, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), supplemented and reaffirmed, 99 N.L.R.B. 1448
(1952), enforced, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
"137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962), enforcement denied, 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963), cert.
granted, 375 U.S. 962 (1964).
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to operate during the lockout.2 5 According to the Board, this action
"upset the balance of conflicting interests" established in Buffalo
Linen.26  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however,
reversed the Board because it did not agree that the mere hiring of
replacements made the lockout retaliatory rather than defensive. 27
The contention that employers may exercise less than the full
right to lock out was based on the Great Falls case,28 where locked
out employees of the nonstruck employers were called back to work
for eighteen hours of work per week so that they could not draw
unemployment compensation. Supposedly this is just the other side
of the coin from the Insurance Agents' case where a slowdown-less
than a total strike-was found to be a harassing technique in collec-
tive bargaining but not an indication in itself of bad faith bargain-
ing under section 8 (b) (3).29 In other words, what is sauce for the
goose is sauce for the gander.
The NLRB stated in the Morand case 0 that even though the
argument that the lockout is the corollary of the strike has an aura
of fairness, in reality it is subject to many inherent defects. To
permit the employer to lock out his employees at any time, for any
reason which is contrary to his interests, would give him a license to
engage in conduct which the Board and the courts have uniformly
found to violate the right of employees to organize and bargain
collectively. Even if the lockout action is taken after a bona fide
impasse in collective bargaining, it is still untenable under sections
8 (a) (1) and (3). As far as section 8 (b) (4) is concerned, it simply
proscribes strikes and lockouts during the sixty day period prior to
modification or termination of an agreement, but it does not sanction
lockouts at other times or under other conditions.
It is also urged that Congress intended to restore equality of
bargaining power under section 13 of the National Labor Relations
Act, but Congress did not so state. Yet it expressly reserved the
21 Brown Food Store, supra note 24, at 74.
20 Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954), set aside sub nom. Truck
Drivers Union v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
27NLRB v. Brown, 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 375 U.S. 962 (1964),
1964 DuKE L.J. 169.
28 Great Falls Employers' Council, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 974 (1959), enforcement denied,
277 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1960).
2- 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
30 Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), enforced in part, remanded
in part, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), supplemented and reaffirmed, 99 N.L.R.B. 1448
(1952), enforced, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
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right to strike. Section 13 of the act as amended states that "nothing
in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be con-
strued so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications of
that right. '"31
It would be extremely naive to assume that because the employer
does not have lockout power as leverage in negotiations, he has no
power to cope with the union. While the unions have the protected
right to strike, that right is not absolute; instead it must be balanced
against the right of the employer to protect his business against un-
usual economic loss. As the Supreme Court has stated, "accommoda-
tion between the two must be obtained with as little destruction of
one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other."32 An em-
ployer is not required to be a sitting duck when caught in strike
activity by the union. He has a rather varied arsenal with which to
protect himself by reasonable measures from harmful economic or
operative consequencies of a strike.33 The employer can replace
economic strikers,3 4 he can put into effect unilaterally any proposals
made to the union during negotiations, 35 or he can continue con-
ditions as they previously existed. The employees, on the other
hand, have no comparable power over the employment situation.
It is therefore the Board's position that the strike is merely a
compensating, and possibly inadequate, substitute by which the
disparity of economic strength is sought to be reduced. Thus viewed,
the lockout would be an aggressive, not a corrective, device. Cer-
tainly it would not effectuate the policies of the act. There is an
obvious and perhaps critical distinction between employer action
designed to assure continuance of productive operations and that of
shutting it down. The former is consonant with the statutory
purpose of achieving uninterrupted production; the latter recogniz-
ably is at odds with it. Recognition of the useful right of an em-
ployer to take action consistent with a basic objective of the act is
not necessarily authority for his taking voluntary and uneconom-
ically motivated action inconsistent with the objective.36 Despite the
31 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 13, 49 Stat. 457 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 163 (1958).
32 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
33 Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951).
3" NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
"NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
"Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951).
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coupling of "strikes and lockouts" under the act, it is by no means
clear that the common law lockout would be protected. The term
"lockout" may mean many things, and it would not make the device
legal in all circumstances not prohibited under the act.
The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act clearly indicates
that while Congress did not intend to prohibit either the strike or
the lockout, there is also nothing to indicate that it viewed the two
as corollaries. Senator Ball of Minnesota, in a debate with Senator
Morse of Oregon (concerning a proposal to change the definition of
"employee" under the act) stated
the Senator speaks of the employers [sic] right to lock out as the parallel
right to the employees [sic] right to strike. It seems to me that this is
faulty reasoning, because no employer, in that sense, ever locks out an
employee. There are very few cases. The only effective weapon the
employer has is to defeat a strike if he thinks it is completely impossible
to reach a settlement.37
Senator Morse replied that he had meant to point out that in
most cases there are both strikes and lockouts.
It has been my experience in this field that many strikes are an insepa-
rable combination of lock-out on the part of the employer and strike on
the part of labor, in the sense that the employer says, 'This is it. Take
it or else.'... Frequently it will be found that it [the strike] was
provoked by the employer and that he greatly welcomed direct action
on the part of the union, because it permitted him to keep concealed
what was also in fact a lock-out as well as a strike.38
Therefore, rather than considering the lockout as corollary of the
strike, Senator Morse was simply pointing out that they frequently
occur as a simultaneous strike-lockout and that labor is not neces-
sarily the causal factor.
In all of the arguments supporting the use of the collective
bargaining lockout, the term "corollary" has been used to indicate
equality, i.e., the lockout equalizes the employer's means of exerting
economic pressure on the union with the union's power to strike.
Obviously if the employer can use other weapons which the union
cannot command, the argument is unfounded. As a consequence,
there is no equality and, therefore, no corollary relationship.
37 93 CONG. REc. 1828 (1947).
38 Ibid.
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II
LACK OF CONSISTENCY IN THE NLRB's DEFINITION OF A LOCKOUT
One of the difficulties in trying to follow Board policy concerning
the lockout is inherent in the way the Board defines, or fails to de-
fine, the term. Although it has consistently held that to permit an
employer to lock out his employees in the absence of any special
mitigating circumstances subjects the union and the employees to
unwarranted and illegal pressure which creates an atmosphere not
conducive to the free opportunity for negotiation contemplated by
section 8 (a) (5),39 the Board has shown a notable lack of consistency
concerning its definition of a lockout. This fact was acknowledged
by the Board itself in the Betts Cadillac Olds decision:
The Board does not appear to have defined the term, and Board
decisions do not reflect any consistent definition. Thus, concepts as
widely separated as a closedown to avoid property loss... ; a cessation of
operations because sporadic strikes interfered with efficient operation
... ; a shutdown in a fit of employer temper during an argument with a
union representative and without purpose to interfere with union or
concerted activity... ; and mass discharges in reprisal for union activity
... have [all] been described as "lockouts." On the other hand, shut-
downs because of economic considerations have been found not to
constitute "lockouts.".. .Nor do the decisions reflect any invidious con-
notation in use of the term 40
Although the term "lockout" has been used in federal legislation
since the early 1930's, it has never been statutorily defined; and it is
not evident whether it means the same as under the common law
or whether it was used to describe all voluntary shutdowns, other
than strike action, consequent to a labor dispute or was confined to
shutdowns for economic or operative reasons.
41
Arbitration awards involving lockouts have tended to follow the
tests laid down by the NLRB decisions, but the term "lockout" is
defined generally as an "employer's refusal to permit employees to
work, even when there is work to be done, in order to coerce them
into performing or refraining from some course of action. '42 The
three characteristics indispensable to a lockout were spelled out in
the General Cable Corp. arbitration: 4 (1) the place of employment
"Great Falls Employers' Council, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 974 (1959).
"0 96 N.L.R.B. 268, 283 (1951).
41 Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., supra note 40.
2 P-H LAB. ARm. SERv. 65371 (1960).
"6 5 Ar. LAB. ARm. AwApas 69048.3 (1952).
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must be closed in part or in whole by the employer; (2) closure
must be an offensive measure rather than a defensive one; (3) closure
must be for the purpose of gaining concessions from the employees.
This definition indicates that the lockout is a temporary action
with no employer intent to make it permanent or to replace em-
ployees. If the Board used the term consistently in this manner and
used "shutdown" or "closure" to indicate permanent discontinuance
of business operations or removal to another site, it would simplify
use and understanding of Board decisions in this area.
Be that as it may, there seems no doubt that the Board is right
in its contention that the use of the lockout as leverage in negotia-
tions would tend to destroy the protected rights of employees under
the act and so contribute to instability in industrial relations.44
However, while the Board's finding that such lockouts violate
sections 8 (a) (1), (3), and (5) was sustained by the Third Circuit
in Quaker State Corp.45 and the Tenth Circuit found them violative
of sections 8 (a) (1) and (3) in Utah Plumbing Ass'n,46 the Fifth
Circuit set aside such findings in Dalton Brick & Tile Corp.4 7 Ac-
cording to the Fifth Circuit, absent evidence that the employer was
motivated by a purpose to discourage union membership or intended
to interfere with its employees' rights, the lockout did not violate
the act. It held that a "lockout may not be made a violation simply
on the ground that this gives advantage to the employer, or takes
advantage away from the employees, or tips the scales one way or
the other."48
If permitted to stand, this decision could virtually nullify the
effectiveness of the right to strike. It also seems to undermine the
policy of balancing conflicting interests. If an individual employer
is to be permitted the use of the lockout to enhance his bargaining
position, then logic suggests that Congress should specifically reserve
this right for him, just as it reserved the right to strike for the
employees.
In light of its reasoning in respect to single employer lockouts,
"4 Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), enforced in part, remanded
in part, 190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), supplemented and reaffirmed, 99 N.L.R.B. 1448
(1952), enforced, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
45 Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 861
U.S. 917 (1959).
" Utah Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 165 (10th Cir.
1961).
47 NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 801 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962).
48 Id. at 899.
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the Board's reasoning concerning the use of multi-employer lock-
outs may be more confusing than enlightening.
III
THE MULTI-EMPLOYER LOCKOUT
In Buffalo Linen Supply Co.,49 the NLRB held that a strike
against one employer-member of a multi-employer bargaining group
constituted a threat of strike against all other members and gave
them the right to employ a temporary lockout in order to safeguard
the integrity of the bargaining unit. In other words, if the union's
purpose in calling such strike is to cause successive and individual
capitulation to its demands, i.e., by whipsawing, the Board con-
siders such a lockout defensive rather than aggressive.50
Prior to the Buffalo Linen decision, however, the Board held
that members of an employer association were no different from
other employers and could only use the lockout as a defense against
a threatened strike to avoid serious economic loss. The Buffalo
Linen decision was thus a definite change in Board policy, consistent
with, and possibly stemming from, the decisions by the Seventh,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.51 The Second Circuit, however, did not
agree with the other circuit court decisions and the Board's view
in Buffalo Linen. It held that although a strike against one member
of an employer association constituted a strike threat against other
members, such action did not justify an association-wide lockout.52
Subsequently, the Supreme Court overruled the Second Circuit and
upheld the lockout in this case as a means of maintaining the in-
tegrity of the multi-employer bargaining unit:
Although the Act protects the right of the employees to strike in
support of their demands, this protection is not so absolute as to deny
self-help by employers when legitimate interests of employees and
employers collide. Conflict may arise, for example, between the right
to strike and the interest of small employers in preserving multi-employer
'" 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954), set aside sub nom. Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB,
231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
11 Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951). Cf. Duluth Bottling Ass'n,
48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943). Similarly, an employer can shut down his plant and move
it for economic reasons.
r' NLRB v. Continental Baking Co., 221 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1955); NLRB v.
Spalding Avery Lumber Co., 220 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1955); Leonard v. NLRB, 205
F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1953); Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
62 Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87
(1957).
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bargaining as a means of bargaining on an equal basis with a large union
and avoiding the competitive disadvantages resulting from nonuniform
contractual terms. The ultimate problem is the balancing of the con-
flicting legitimate interests. ...
The Court of Appeals ... erred, however, in too narrowly con-
fining the exercise of Board discretion to the cases of economic hardship.
We hold that in the circumstances of this case the Board correctly
balanced the conflicting interests in deciding that a temporary lockout
to preserve the multi-employer bargaining basis from the disintegration
threatened by the Union's strike action was lawful.53
The Supreme Court decision raises some interesting questions.
The proponents of the collective bargaining lockout ask: if the
other members of an employer association who have not been struck
are privileged to use the lockout, why cannot a single employer
utilize the same weapon as a defensive measure? Also, if a lockout
against whipsawing can be considered an aggressive act when com-
mitted by employers individually, how can it be considered any less
aggressive simply because it is carried out in concert?
As an illustration, assume an impasse in negotiations between
the United Automobile Workers and General Motors Corporation.
According to the NLRB and the Supreme Court, GM cannot lock
out its employees until after the UAW calls a strike. To do so
prior to the strike call is an aggressive act which precludes the op-
portunity for bona fide collective bargaining. If, however, GM,
Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors combine into an association
for the purpose of negotiation, then a strike against one becomes a
strike against all; and the three nonstruck firms may lock out im-
mediately, since the lockout is then considered a defense of the
integrity of the multi-employer bargaining unit. Moreover, they
can go further. Under the Great Falls decision, the employers
who have locked out their nonstriking employees may call them back
for whatever number of hours of work will preclude their drawing
unemployment compensation (under state laws which permit such
compensation during a labor dispute). Only GM can hire perma-
nent replacements for its striking employees; the other employers
may not, since they locked out their employees, and there is some
doubt that they can even hire temporary replacements.5 4 As a matter
r3 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96-97 (1957).
" Brown Food Store, 137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962), enforcement denied, 319 F.2d 7
(10th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 375 U.S. 962 (1964).
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of fact, if GM hires replacements, the other members of the associa-
tion no longer have any reason to continue the lockout. If they do
continue it, however, they not only lose business to GM which is
open and operating, but they also court an unfair labor practice be-
cause their employees are and were at the time of the lockout willing
to work on their respective employer's terms. 5
This hypothetical case poses this very interesting question: if a
strike against one is a strike or threat of strike against all members
of an employer association sufficient to warrant a multi-employer
lockout, why can only the struck employer hire replacements? Why
should the employees of the other members be considered "locked
out" rather than "on strike"? Was it not the threat of strike and
the resultant threat of impairment to the multi-employer bargaining
unit which initially caused the lockout and made it permissible?
While it may be argued that the legitimacy of the lockout depends
not upon the strike or threat of strike but upon the effect of the
strike on the bargaining unit, such an argument is more semantic
than real. Absent the strike, there would have been no reason for
a lockout, for the employers' interest in group bargaining would
have suffered no actual or threatened impairment. The strike is
the causal factor; to attempt to separate the fact of the strike from
its effects serves little purpose. Therefore, if the Board and the
courts consider that the strike warrants a defensive lockout, there
seems little justification for denying the other employer members
the same right to hire permanent replacements which exists in any
economic strike.
Although the Tenth Circuit in NLRB v. Brown56 carefully stipu-
lated that the locked out employees were not placed in the status
of actual strikers, there is room for argument on this point. It is
just as realistic to consider these employees "on strike" as "locked
out." In the dissent to the NLRB majority opinion in the Brown
case, 57 members Fanning and Rodgers maintained that the regular
employees of the nonstruck employers are not necessarily "willing to
work at the employers' terms," as the majority said. The sentiment
of these employees is no different from that of the striking em-
ployees. The difference lies in the fact that they are willing only
" 19 P-H LAB. REt'. No. 46 (June 7, 1962).
319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 375 U.S. 962 (1964).
'1 Brown Food Store, 137 N.L.R.B. 73, 77 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
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to receive wages, while the actual striking employees in the rest of
the association-wide unit are exerting whipsaw pressure on one
employer in order to gain benefits which will ultimately accrue to
all employees in the association-wide unit, including those who are
locked out. Viewed in this light, it may be contended that perma-
nent replacement of these employees is as justifiable as in any
economic strike. If the struck employer can permanently replace
economic strikers on the ground that this diminution of the pro-
tected right to strike is necessary to accommodate the employer's
legitimate conflicting interest in maintaining economic activity,58
it would seem to follow that temporary replacement of their em-
ployees is well within the rights of the nonstruck employers. Tem-
porary replacement is less, not more, than the right of permanent
replacement granted in Mackay. Therefore, if the nonstruck em-
ployers should be forbidden to hire even temporary replacements,
the Board's decision in the Brown case renders largely illusory the
lockout right granted to members of a multi-employer bargaining
unit by limiting their choice to either ignoring the whipsaw or
closing down completely. If they choose to ignore the whipsaw, in
effect they subsidize the strike by permitting their own employees
to continue to work; if they choose to close down, they lose business
to the struck employer who is able to make permanent replacements.
According to NLRB members Fanning and Rodgers:
The inequity of the majority's holding becomes evident when con-
trasted with its holding as to Food Jet, the first employer struck. Food
Jet attempted to obtain replacements and is found not to have violated
the Act; the other four employers did the same thing, but are found to
have acted unlawfully. We can see no justification for thus treating the
members of the Association differently; in our view, it is not consistent
with the Supreme Court's concept of preserving the integrity of the as-
sociation-wide unit, and unfairly handicaps those employers subject to
the threatened whipsaw tactics. They must either wait to be picked off
one at the time by the "whipsawing" union, or close down completely
and cease operating, contrary to their right under Mackay.59
Since the Supreme Court has ruled that the multi-employer
lockout is privileged in such cases, it is difficult to see how the per-
formance of such a nondiscriminatory act as temporary replacement
could make the lockout unlawful. 60 As mentioned earlier, the
58 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
59 Brown Food Store, 137 N.L.R.B. 73, 78 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
60 Id. at 77-79.
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Tenth Circuit agreed that it could not and reversed the Board.61
If the multi-employer lockout is a bona fide defense of the bar-
gaining unit, as the Buffalo Linen and Great Falls cases maintain,
there is every reason to believe that the decisions of the Board and
the courts are promoting and encouraging the growth of multi-
employer bargaining. Where this effectuates the policies of the act
in stabilizing industrial relations, it is not open to question; but this
is not always the case. There has been no real distinction drawn
between the need for the collective display of strength in negotiation
by small employers when dealing with a powerful union in contrast
to the presumed lack of such need when powerful employers negoti-
ate. The companies in the automotive industry have never bar-
gained as an association. Obviously they feel capable of individually
negotiating on an equal basis with the UAW. Yet, repeatedly the
UAW subjects these companies to whipsawing tactics. If they com-
bined and bargained as a group, the whole industry could lock out
its thousands of employees when one of them was struck. Would
this have a stabilizing effect on industrial relations, to the end that
there is no obstruction to the free flow of commerce? Far from it.
And there would certainly be some doubt that this action would tend
to balance the conflicting legitimate interests of the employers and
employees. Yet under the Buffalo Linen decision, these powerful
employers would be within their rights to exercise such a "defensive"
lockout.
It is not disputed that the total strike, though protected, is not
an absolute right. It is limited in certain important respects by the
Taft-Hartley Act. Congress has been rather specific when it has
come to outlaw particular economic weapons on the part of unions.62
However, nowhere among these restrictions is whipsawing outlawed
as a collective bargaining device. By the same token, nowhere is it
specifically protected. It occupies the same twilight zone of legal
uncertainty as do the lockout and the slowdown. However, how
can it be seriously maintained that organization among employers
in effect transforms whipsawing into a tactic "so indefensible" that
the collective employers may lock out to combat it when only one
of them has been struck, but unorganized employers suffering the
01 NLRB v. Brown, 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 375 U.S. 962 (1964).
6' National Labor Relations Act § 8 (b) (4), added by 61 Stat. 141-42 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. IV, 1963).
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same tactics must wait to be struck individually before being per-
mitted to defend themselves by locking out? The threat of a strike
is no less real or damaging to a single employer, such as those in the
automotive industry, than it is to employers in an association.
Since the objective of whipsawing is to bring pressure against
individual employers in an effort to gain concessions, it does not
involve the selection of the employers' bargaining agent or their
combination into a unit for bargaining, and in itself, it is not an
indication of bad faith bargaining. Timing is an integral part of the
effectiveness of any strike, and timing is what makes the whipsaw
strike effective. The multi-employer lockout negates this effective-
ness. If the right to strike means anything, its use as a whipsawing
device does not make it less protected. Moreover, the threat of a
strike is a time-honored negotiating device and does not necessarily
mean that the strike will in fact take place. The multi-employer
lockout not only undermines the effectiveness of the strike, but it also
gives a hollow ring to its use as a bargaining threat.
Despite Supreme Court sanction, there is still doubt that the
multi-employer lockout is justifiable under the act, that a strike
against one member of an association justifies an association-wide
lockout. This is particularly so when it appears to be within the
power of an employer to virtually nullify sections 7 and 13 of the
act by the simple expedient of joining a multi-employer association.03
The fact that employers combine into associations means that they
have greater strength to combat the union's demands. However,
this does not grant them license to use their combined strength in a
way which is forbidden to them separately and individually. Nor is
it evident how such an association-wide lockout effectuates the
stabilization of industrial relations. If anything, it accentuates and
extends the area of discord. 64 Furthermore, it places the single
employer who may not wish to join an association or who does not
have the opportunity to do so in an unfavorable position. If whip-
sawing is really indefensible as an economic weapon when used
against an employer association, is it not equally indefensible when
used against a single employer? The purpose is certainly the same
'3 This possibility is pointed out in the dissenting opinion in Buffalo Linen Supply
Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447, 452 (1954), set aside sub nom. Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB,
231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
0, See DAVEY, CONTEMPORARY CoLLEcTIVE BARGAINING 93-97 (1959).
[Vol. 1964: 257
-playing one employer off against another to force capitulation to
union demands.
Finally, it is not clear how the decision in Buffalo Linen permit-
ting the use of the multi-employer lockout is any less a judgment
by the NLRB of types of economic weapons permissible in collective
bargaining than was the decision in the Insurance Agents' case,
where the Board was expressly told it did not have this power. If
the NLRB can determine only the purposes and not the types of
economic weapons at the disposal of the disputing parties, does the
Board have the right to tell the parties in what manner the weapons
may or may not be utilized? If, as the Supreme Court avers, Con-
gress alone has the right to determine legitimate economic weapons,
surely Congress rather than the Board or the courts should restrict
the use of whipsawing tactics. It would therefore seem more in
keeping with the policies of the act for Congress to make whipsawing
an unfair labor practice where the purpose of this action is the de-
struction of the multi-employer bargaining unit, thereby obviating
the necessity for using the multi-employer lockout. This would
serve to balance the legitimate conflicting economic interests of em-
ployers and employees, and it would aid in stabilizing industrial
relations by keeping the nonstruck plants open and operating.
IV
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE USE OF THE MULTI-EMPLOYER LOCKOUT
In spite of pro and con arguments, however, the inescapable fact
is that the multi-employer lockout is currently permissible. There-
fore, it may be useful to examine some of the possible effects it could
have upon negotiations, union tactics, and the broader area of
industrial relations.
A. The Employer-Employee Relationship
For one thing, it will be very difficult for a nonstruck employer
of an employer association to convince his employees that he has
their interests in mind during negotiations if he has locked them out.
Once he severs his communication lines in the plant, the only pic-
ture the employees will get of negotiations is the one the union
presents to them. Once an agreement is reached, it will automati-
cally be one the union "won" for the employees from a grudging
management. In addition to losing production and perhaps part of
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his market during the lockout, the employer may find that he has
also lost the "ear" of his employees.
B. Changes in Union Tactics
A more important and far-reaching effect of the multi-employer
lockout, however, may be a change in union tactics. If the right to
strike is dissipated by lockout, the union may decide to resort to a
greater use of the slowdown, 65 an unprotected but not forbidden
activity6 (except in secondary boycott cases), which is much harder
to detect and handle than the total strike. The slowdown is a form
of on-the-job activity in which workers, while appearing to be
engaged in their usual routines, deliberately limit their output in
order to exert pressure on management to make some desired change.
It is difficult to pinpoint, since workers perform at their usual pace
while a supervisor is present but slack off when he moves away.
A whole department may slow down without management dis-
covering the instigators or being able to prove that a slowdown is
going on.
The unions have argued repeatedly that the slowdown is a pro-
tected form of concerted activity, basing their argument upon sec-
tion 13 of the Wagner Act as amended when read in conjunction
with section 501 (2) of the Taft-Hartley Act.67 In the Briggs-Strat-
ton case, however, the Supreme Court pointed out that section 13
plus the definition provides only that "nothing in this Act... shall be
construed so as to interfere with or impede" the right to engage in
these activities. 68 What other federal statutes or state laws might do
01 Hammett, Seidman & London, The Slowdown as a Union Tactic, 65 J. POL. ECON.
126 (1957). The slowdown is fairly common in portions of American industry where
the nature of the wor!l and the type of wage payment make the limitation of produc-
tion a means by which a group of workers can exert pressure on management.
Though the union usually disclaims responsibility for slowdowns, workers are some-
what less likely in the absence of a union organization to possess the cohesiveness
and experienced leadership necessary for the successful use of the slowdown technique.
Even in plants in which the slowdown has been used quite often, union leaders have
some doubt about its legitimacy, and rank and file members have even nore.
Management generally condemns its use, arguing that it violates the contract and that
a grievance should be filed instead.
06 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
67 Section 501 (2) states: "The term 'strike' includes any strike or other concerted
stoppage of work by employees (including a stoppage by reason of the expiration of a
collective-bargaining agreement) and any concerted slow-down or other concerted inter-
ruption of operations by employees." 61 Stat. 161 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 142 (2) (1958).
For § 13 of the Wagner Act, as amended, see the text at note 31 supra.
'1 International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S.
245, 263 (1949).
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is not attempted to be regulated by this section. 9 In addition,
the Court said that the definition of the strike in section 501 (2) was
to be considered only in connection with section 8 (b) (4) and not
with section 13. In other words, it describes proscribed activities,
i.e., concerted activities the objectives of which have been declared
illegal and unfair labor practices, rather than defining protected
concerted activities. Therefore, the purpose of the Taft-Hartley
Act was not to grant dispensation for the strike, but it was to outlaw
strikes undertaken for illegal purposes.70 Viewed in this light, it
cannot be assumed that all work stoppages are federally protected
concerted activities. The NLRB is empowered to forbid a strike
only when its purpose is one which the Taft-Hartley Act makes il-
legal; it has no power to rule on the method of the strike.
In the Insurance Agents' case,71 the concerted activity took the
form of a union-sponsored slowdown and sit-in by insurance sales-
men designed to harass the employer during negotiations. The
NLRB, relying solely upon section 8 (b) (3), found such tactics to be
an indication of bad faith bargaining. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, took the position that the Board was sitting in judgment upon
economic weapons or the method rather than the motives and
purpose, and it overturned the Board's ruling on the ground that the
Board could not support its finding by relying upon section 8 (b) (3)
alone. In so doing, the Court said that the Board "has sought to
introduce some standard of properly 'balanced' bargaining power,
or some new distinction of justifiable and unjustifiable, proper and
'abusive' economic weapons into the collective bargaining duty im-
posed by the Act." 72 Had the Board brought additional evidence
before the Court, particularly conduct of the union at the bargain-
ing table indicative of bad faith bargaining, its unfair labor practice
charge might very well have been sustained. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, in his dissent, agreed with the majority that the Board could
not sustain its finding on the basis of section 8 (b) (3) alone, but he
thought the Court should have remanded the case to the Board for
the presentation of additional evidence. He also took issue with the
majority for fashioning rules governing collective bargaining on the
assumption that the power and position of labor unions and their
00 Id. at 263-64.
70 Id. at 261-63.
71 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
72 Id. at 497.
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solidarity is now what it was twenty-five years ago. "Accretion of
power may carry with it increasing responsibility for the manner of
its exercise." 73 Instead of emphasizing the bellicose nature of the
collective bargaining process and the right of industrial combatants
to force acceptance of their demands by various economic weapons,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter thought the Court should encourage reason
and the willingness to use it as the dominant force in bargaining.
To assume from this case that the slowdown is a legally protected
form of concerted activity is unwarranted by the facts. The Court
did not rule on whether the slowdown and sit-in are legal; it simply
said that they were neither forbidden by federal statute nor legalized
and approved thereby and that they were not per se unfair labor
practices. However, the Court did call attention to the Briggs-
Stratton case, mentioned above, in which it had stated:
If we were... to make the [right to] strike an absolute right and the
definition to extend the right to all other variations of the strike, the
effect would be to legalize beyond the power of any state or federal
authorities to control not only the intermittant stoppages such as we
have here but also the slowdown and perhaps the sit-down strike as well.7 4
The NLRB's attitude toward the slowdown (as evidenced by its
finding in the Insurance Agents' case) is of fairly recent origin.
Prior to 1950 the NLRB had not considered partial strikes to be
unprotected concerted activity. In a 1938 decision in Harnischfeger
Corp.,75 the Board determined that a union-sponsored refusal to
work overtime did not constitute an action "so indefensible" as to
warrant discharge. Although the refusal to work beyond eight hours
on any shift caused the company considerable difficulty, it did not
occasion the much more serious difficulty resulting from a total
strike. Since employees could not be discharged for calling a
strike, the Board did not see how such action could be sustained in
the case of the partial strike.
The test laid down in the Harnischfeger case by the Board left a
considerable degree of latitude in the interpretation of what con-
stituted "indefensible" action sufficient to overcome the presumed
intent of Congress to sanction concerted activities. Obviously, if the
7 3 Id. at 501.
74 International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., £36 U.S.
245, 264 (1949).
7. 9 N.L.R.B. 676 (1988).
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objective sought or the method used were illegal, then the activity
would be denied protection.
The circuit courts, however, had consistently held that partial
strikes were not protected activities because employees have no right
to defy any reasonable order of an employer unless they stop work
completely.76 Apparently the courts wanted to limit the restrictions
which the act placed on management's right to discipline defiant
employees.77
When the Elk Lumber case"8 came before the Board in 1950, the
issue was whether or not an employer could discharge employees
for instituting a slowdown to protest a change in computation of
pay from a piece rate system to an hourly rate. Citing the "inde-
fensible" test laid down in the Harnischfeger case, the Board then
reversed its reasoning concerning indefensible activity. Whereas
before it had found the partial strike to be protected activity, it now
found the object legal but the means a refusal to accept the terms of
employment of the employer without engaging in a work stoppage
and a continuation at work on the employees' own terms. The
Board thus took the same line of reasoning as the circuit courts.
However, it did not follow the thinking of the Supreme Court in
Briggs-Stratton, for in the Elk Lumber case, the Board found the
purpose of the action legal but the method, the slowdown, "inde-
fensible" and no longer a lesser form of protected activity. This
general proscription of the slowdown was definitely a ruling by the
Board on the types of economic weapons which may or may not be
used by the parties to collective bargaining. From 1950 until the
Insurance Agents' ruling in 1960, the Board routinely considered
the use of the slowdown during negotiations as evidence of bad faith
bargaining. After the Insurance Agents' decision, the Board re-
versed itself and in subsequent cases held that such tactics were not
in themselves a violation of section 8 (b) (3).79
An interesting parallel could be drawn between this situation
involving the slowdown and the recent case concerning the agency
11See, e.g., NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946);
NLRB v. Condenser Corp. of America, 128 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1942); C. G. Conn, Ltd. v.
NLRB, 108 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1939).
77 60 YALE L.J. 529 (1951).
78 Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950).
71 Lumber & Sawmill Workers, 130 N.L.R.B. 235 (1961); Local 220, Int'l Union of
Elec. Workers, 127 N.L.R.B. 1514 (1960); Fleming, The Obligation to Bargain in
Good Faith, in PUBLIc PoIcY AND COLLErIcW BARGAINING 60, 77 (Shister, Aaron, &
Summers ed. 1962).
Vol. 1964: 257]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
shop as a form of union security. The slowdown occupies a position
in relation to the total strike somewhat analogous to that of the
agency shop in relation to the union shop. The agency shop is not
specifically permitted by the Taft-Hartley Act, but the Supreme
Court has recently held that it is a lesser form of union security and
therefore legal under the Taft-Hartley Act.80 However, the Court
has not viewed the slowdown as a lesser form of a protected activity,
the total strike, and therefore also protected81 Had it done so, the
slowdown could have been treated, as has been suggested,8 2 in the
same manner as a complete work stoppage. If the employer wished
to guard against such action, he could negotiate for it as he would for
protection against the total strike; and in the event that a slowdown
did occur, he could seek to replace the employees unless they agreed
to work on his terms or he could institute a lockout against them.
Of course, treating the slowdown in the same manner as a total
strike is essentially what the Board did prior to the Elk Lumber
case. However, with the slowdown now moved from the protected
category, there is no legal barrier to prevent an employer from using
his common law right to lock out his defiant employees or to replace
them. In the first instance he would simply be converting the un-
protected partial strike into a total strike, and in the second he
would be replacing his employees just as if they were engaged in an
economic strike.83 So long as there was no purpose of an illegal
nature (such as a secondary boycott) involved in the slowdown and
no other evidence indicating bad faith bargaining, the employees
could use the slowdown during negotiations.8 4 The employer, how-
ever, would not have to suffer it without retaliation.
The Insurance Agents' decision raises a number of questions.
1o NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963). However, the Supreme
Court has subsequently held that states with so-called "right to work" laws may
prohibit the enforcement of an agency shop clause in a collective bargaining agree-
ment and that the state courts, rather than solely the NLRB, are tribunals with
jurisdiction to enforce the state prohibition. Retail Clerks Ass'n v. Schermerhorn,
375 U.S. 96 (1963).
1Cf. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477, 492-94 (1960).
12 Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954), set aside sub nom. Truck
Drivers Union v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
83 "[I]t is not illegal for an employer to discharge employees, who, instead of
striking in the conventional manner to support their grievances, persist in remaining
on their jobs, while refusing in defiance of reasonable instructions of their employer
to perform part of their allotted work tasks, and thereby in effect unilaterally attempt
to prescribe their own terms of work." Cyril de Cordova & Bro., 91 N.L.R.B. 1121,
1136 (1951).
8I NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
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A basic question concerns whether the slowdown is defensible as an
economic weapon under any circumstances. Those who believe
that it is not will certainly not find comfort in the Court's decision.
It is difficult to understand how a slowdown may be sanctioned when
the sit-down strike was declared illegal, for the slowdown bears a
much closer resemblance to that tactic than it does to the complete
withdrawal of services. Like the sit-down strike, the slowdown in-
volves holding another's property while producing at an unsatis-
factory rate rather than not at all. In effect, it is like having one's
cake and eating it too. The workers will not vacate their jobs, they
will not produce at a normal rate, but they continue to draw their
pay. In other words, until such time as the employer can pinpoint
the slowdown, place responsibility for it, and replace the workers, if
possible, he is in the position of subsidizing his own strike. The
slowdown does not ordinarily take place like a regular strike.85
A whole department does not just slow down all at once. Workers
may work at a normal rate while a supervisor is near but slow down
when he moves away. It is a hit-and-run method, a subversive form
of a strike. There is nothing in the slowdown which makes it de-
fensible, particularly since the concerted refusal to work under
unsatisfactory conditions is protected by law and available for use
as a protest.
Where there is a contract providing for a grievance procedure,
certainly its use should be encouraged for settling problems arising
under the contract rather than the use of the slowdown. If there is
no contract and therefore no grievance procedure, as is the case
when a contract has expired (and has not been extended) before a
new one is agreed upon or where an initial contract has not yet
been signed, employees may still resort to the total strike. There is
nothing in the slowdown conducive to constructive negotiations or
the stabilization of industrial relations.
If the Supreme Court intended to "promulgate a per se rule that
a partial strike could not be evidence of a failure to bargain in good
faith""" in the Insurance Agents' case, it has effectively granted im-
munity to the slowdown as an employer harassing tactic, a job
85 The slowdown may take many forms other than a slowdown in production.
For example, it may occur in materials failing to reach the production lines promptly
or letting a machinery breakdown occur instead of informing the foreman of the
need for repair work.
" See note 79 supra.
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reserved to Congress which Congress itself did not do. Congress did
not protect or prohibit the slowdown. It left to the NLRB the
decision whether the conduct of a party to the negotiation consti-
tuted an unfair labor practice. Although the NLRB decisions are,
and should be, subject to limited judicial review to the end that the
Board does not exceed its statutory authority, the Supreme Court
should not hamper the Board in its discretionary powers by unduly
doctrinaire or arbitrary decisions, where the Court in effect simply
substitutes its own judgment for that of the Board. As the Court
itself said in Phelps Dodge:
There is an area plainly covered by the language of the Act and an
area no less plainly without it. But in the nature of things Congress
could not catalogue all the devices and strategems for circumventing the
policies of the act. Nor could it define the whole gamut of remedies to
effectuate these policies in an infinite variety of specific situations. Con-
gress met these difficulties by leaving the adaptation of means to ends to
the empiric process of administration.87
Therefore, it may be argued that if the slowdown is to be sanc-
tioned under any circumstances in the employee-employer relation-
ship, Congress or the NLRB, rather than the Supreme Court, should
do it.
V
CONCLUSION
If the multi-employer lockout, which dissipates the union's right
to strike, promotes and encourages unions to retaliate with the slow-
down, a tactic which infringes upon management's right to direct its
labor force and utilize its plant and equipment efficiently, then the
search for industrial peace through constructive labor relations will
undoubtedly be retarded. If the single employer lockout as a pres-
sure tactic in negotiations should be permitted as well, then Pan-
dora's box of evils for industrial relations would be a fait accompli.
Although it has been contended that employers in the past have
used the common law lockout infrequently during bargaining be-
cause either they have been strong enough without it, they wished
to avoid the economic loss entailed, or they feared that it would
constitute an unfair labor practice, there is no assurance that em-
ployers in the future would neglect its use if it had legal sanction.
The very fact that in the past few years there have been an increasing
s7 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
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number of plant closures to avoid bargaining with the union indi-
cates that employers may be willing to suffer some economic loss
on a permanent basis in order to avoid assuming their responsibili-
ties under the act.88 There is the distinct possibility that employers
in areas traditionally hostile to unions would use the collective
bargaining lockout to destroy the union. Since the burden of proof
rests with the Board, an employer could risk the finding of an unfair
labor practice (a refusal to bargain in good faith) if the lockout had
already accomplished its purpose. Employers willing to close a
plant permanently in the face of the union would not be likely to
overlook the possibilities inherent in the collective bargaining lock-
out. Such a lockout plus mutual employer protection plans would
insure defeat of the union and collective bargaining. Certainly this
cannot be construed as effectuating the purposes of the National
Labor Relations Act.
88 See, e.g., Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962), enforcement denied,
325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3365 (U.S. April 21, 1964).
